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1986 SURVEY OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE COURTS
Carl H. Esbeck *
The purpose of this survey is to note important caselaw developments in the state and lower federal courts concerning religious liberty. Purposely omitted are the widely reported United States
Supreme Court opinions, as well as cases where the high court has
granted review during its 1986-87 term. The focus here is to collect
significant cases that may otherwise escape broad attention. Only the
facts and rationale of each court's decision is recorded. No editorial
comment on the merits of these cases is intended.
I.

LABOR PRACTICES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Minnesota v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 25, 1986).
A Minnesota appeals court has upheld an administrative law
judge's ruling that an employee was unlawfully discharged because of
his marital status. Randy Fitzloff brought suit under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.01 et seq., claiming that he
was discharged from his employment as a farm laborer because he
was living with a woman to whom he was not married. Suit was
brought against Porter Farms and James Sorenson, who was found to
be acting as its agent. Fitzloff, who was employed to help Sorenson
with the operation of a farm, lived in a trailer near Sorenson's home.
After discovering that Fitzloff was not married to the woman, Sorenson informed him that he was "living in sin" and would have to make
a major decision within seven days and carry it out within two
months. When again confronted, Fitzloff informed Sorenson that he
would probably be getting married but not within two months. Sorenson then purportedly told Fitzloff "you're through." Fitzloff interpreted the statement as meaning that he was fired and claimed that
Sorenson's act constituted discrimination.
Rejecting Porter Farms' contention that Fitzloff had voluntarily
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quit his employment, the court found that Sorenson's statement and
failure to take any subsequent remedial action constituted substantial
evidence that Fitzloff was terminated. Further, it found that under the
Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning in McClure v. Sports and
Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844. (Minn. 1985), app. dismissed, 106 S.Ct.
3315 (1986), the Human Rights Act protects from discrimination unmarried couples who are living together.
The court rejected the defense that the Act, as applied, violated
Sorenson's free exercise of religion. Sorenson urged that the court
should distinguish this case from Sports and Health Club, since the
religious and associational freedoms were exercised in his home rather
than in the marketplace. In that previous case, it was held that the
Act did not violate an employer's speech, associational or free exercise
rights either facially or as applied. Sorenson claimed that when the
rights were exercised in the ]home, the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify enforcement of the Act. The court found
no basis for a distinction, observing that just because Fitzloff was required to live in a trailer near Sorenson's home as a condition of employment "[did] not alter the prohibition against discrimination in
employment." The court also refused to review the Minnesota
Supreme Court's determination that the Act covered unmarried
couples who are living together. Sorenson had argued that reconsideration was possible: because the court's extension of coverage to unmarried couples was made without discussion by the majority.
In re D'Amico, 122 App. Div. 2d 472, 504 N.Y.S.2d 861 (3d Dept.
July 24, 1986).
A New York appeals court has upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to Philip J. D"Amico, finding that he voluntarily resigned his position without good cause. D'Amico, "a nondenominational biblical Christian" resigned his position as a respiratory therapist with Green & Kellogg, Inc. in response to an official
reprimand for discussing religion with patients. Following a patient's
complaint concerning D'Amico's statement that he had cured three
people through the laying on of hands, he was asked to sign a warning
agreement that he not discuss religion with interested or disinterested
patients while working. The agreement provided for immediate dismissal for the next offense. D'Amico refused to sign. Rather, he resigned, stating that his religious convictions required that he
"immediately discuss religion with those who would seek such
discussion."

1986 COURT SURVEY

431]

The court, citing evidence that D'Amico received prior oral
warnings concerning his religious discussion and that he was permitted to discuss religion with patients during nonworking hours, affirmed the denial of benefits. The court found D'Amico's claims
distinguishable from those advanced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), and Thomas v. Indiana Employment Security Div. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1982), finding this was not a case "where a change
in condition of employment rendered the employment itself religiously objectionable." The court also rejected D'Amico's claim that
the employer's action violated his free speech rights, noting evidence
that his speech interfered with his job performance, and that his employer accommodated his free expression rights by permitting him to
speak with patients during nonworking hours.
II.

TAXES AND TAX REGULATIONS

Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 6-7, 1986), aff'd., 822 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. Jun. 30, 1987).
Bethel Baptist Church's challenge to the imposition of social security taxes on its employees was dismissed by a federal district court.
The court found that the burdens the tax placed on Bethel's free exercise of religion were permissible in light of the government's compelling interest in maintaining a uniform tax system.
Under the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 9821, § 102(b)(1)(C), (b)(2), 97 Stat. 70-71, and the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, churches became liable
for the payment of social security taxes on their employees unless they
opted out within a statutorily defined period. In the event that a
church chooses not to participate, its employees become subject to the
social security tax at the self-employment rate. In either instance, the
church is required to withhold and pay the appropriate funds to the
government. Prior to the amendments, nonprofit organizations including churches were automatically excluded from social security
participation unless they affirmatively elected to participate.
Bethel declined to elect out of the program, and instead paid the
taxes and filed a claim for a refund which was denied. Fifteen days
after the deadline for opting out, the church filed suit challenging the
law's constitutionality on establishment, free exercise and equal protection grounds. The church was joined in its action by the pastor,
church officers, five employees, and parents of children attending a
school operated by the church.
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The court found that the employees had standing to sue. In addition, the parent plaintiffs were found to have standing on the basis
of their claim that the imposition of the taxes made it financially more
difficult to educate their children in religious schools. Quoting Grove
v. Mead School District, No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985), the
court observed that the right to control the religious upbringing of
one's children was one aspect of the religious freedom of parents. The
pastors and officers of the church were dismissed as plaintiffs since
they were found to have no interest distinguishable from that of the
church.
The court upheld the right of the church to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, rejecting the government's assertion that the
suit was barred because the: church could have avoided the tax by
electing out of participation in the program. The court noted the
church's belief that Christians were responsible to provide for their
own care, and if they were unable to do so, the church was obligated
to provide for them. The church had argued that its ability to carry
out its religious mission was burdened because of the money paid for
social security. It further indicated that, if the entire tax burden had
fallen on its employees, it would have felt a responsibility to increase
wages to compensate for social security costs. The court noted that,
regardless of the alternative chosen, the church would have less funds
available to it. In addition,, the court found that the government's
argument failed to address the concern advanced by the employees,
since they remained subject to the tax regardless of any action taken
by the church.
Addressing the merits, the court found the state's interest in securing uniform participation in the social security program sufficiently compelling to override the burden on the free exercise of
religion. In reaching its decision, the court rejected the interpretations offered by both sides of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). In Lee the Court held that an
Amish employer, who employed other Amish individuals in his carpentry shop, was liable for social security taxes notwithstanding his
religious objections to the tax. In the government's argument that
Lee was controlling, it claimed that, by employing "a school administrator, secretary. maintenance man, etc., Bethel enter[ed] into commercial activity." However, the church urged that its employees were
not engaged in a commercial function and that the government's argument focused too narrowly on the function being performed. Fur-
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thermore, it stressed that the instant case involved a direct tax on a
church and its employees.
The court accepted the church's argument that it was not engaged in a secular function. The court commented, "[c]ertainly,
viewed in isolation, a secretary's duties would appear to be no different whether performed for a church or a business. Yet when performed for a church, they may be in furtherance of the church's goals
and therefore serve a religious purpose." However, the court also
found that the church had mischaracterized Lee as merely an "attempt to escape taxes on a secular business by resort to a religious
belief." It noted the sincerity of the belief at issue in Lee and stated,
"[i]t is immaterial that the claim was made by a lay person rather
than a minister or a church." Lee was found controlling because of
its emphasis on the government's "overriding interest in maintaining
mandatory participation by covered employers and employees." Commenting on the confusion that could result if individuals were permitted to exempt themselves from taxation on the basis of religion, the
court concluded that the "government interest at stake [in Lee] was
not simply maintaining mandatory participation in the social security
system by covered employers and employees. Rather, the government's interest was far more fundamental-preserving the integrity of
the tax collection system."
Rejecting the contention that the imposition constituted a tax on
religious exercise, the court described it as "a nondiscriminatory, uniform tax with a secular purpose." The court concluded that the
church's failure to challenge the income tax program demonstrated
that "its real complaint is not with the constitutionality of the social
security tax but with its novel application to the Church's
employees."
The court also dismissed an excessive entanglement claim, in
which the church argued that imposition of the program would cause
impermissible "governmentally supervised record keeping and surveillance." Finally, the church argued that under the program the
employees were treated differently from both the church's pastor and
other self-employed individuals. The court rejected both contentions.
Koolau Baptist Church v. Departmentof Labor & IndustrialRelations,
718 P.2d 267 (Haw. Apr. 15, 1986).
The Hawaii Supreme Court has ruled that a church-operated
school was obligated to pay unemployment compensation taxes on its
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lay employees. The Koolau Baptist Church challenged the tax assessment claiming that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311, preempted the Hawaii Employment Security
Law. HAW. REV. STAT. § 383 et seq. FUTA exempts ministers but
not lay employees.
The court determined that the Supreme Court's reasoning in St.
Martin EvangelicalLutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772
(1981), did not invalidate the Hawaii law. In St. Martin, the Court
found that FUTA did not require church-affiliated schools to pay unemployment tax. The Hawaii court found St. Martin's distinguishable. It determined that in enacting FUTA, Congress had not
intended preemption with regard to coverage provisions, and that the
Supreme Court had not ruled that FUTA's provisions were "to apply
uniformly to all state unemployment schemes." Rather, the court
characterized FUTA as prescribing only minimum standards which
employers must meet to qualify for federal payroll tax credits.
Further, it found that the required contributions did not constitute undue burdens on religious exercise but were only financial burdens "in the same sense that 'the costs of employing paid workers at
all are financial burdens." Because the court found that the program
did not result in a substantial burden, there was no need to determine
if the government acted pursuant to a compelling state interest.
The court held that the imposition of unemployment taxes did
not implicate religious beliefs as such, and that the church had cited
no religious tenet in claiming a first amendment exemption. According to the court, the church argued that the function of the faculty
and staff was a per se religious exercise and then implied that state
imposition of any financial burdens infringed religious freedom. Citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), the court found that not all burdens on religious
exercise were unconstitutional, and that religious activities could be
subject to regulations designed to promote health, safety and welfare.
The court determined the focus of the program to be "the economic
and social aspect of' the employment relation" and the detrimental
consequences of unemployment. It stressed that the burden imposed
on the church-operated school was religiously neutral.
The court also rejected the church's establishment clause argument. The church claimed that excessive entanglement between
church and state could arise in determining benefit eligibility because
the need to make "good cause" determinations might implicate matters of religious doctrine. The court found that it was "not in a posi-
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tion to rule the process of determining eligibility for benefits under the
law fosters excessive entanglement with religion." Further, it did not
think dismissals from church schools over matters of religious doctrine were so common as to justify an exemption from the unemployment compensation program. The court rejected the contention that
the extensive record keeping required by the program would foster
excessive entanglement. The court cited Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), where the Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument with regard to the record-keeping
requirements imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Nampa Christian Schools Foundation. Inc. v. Idaho, 110 Idaho 918,
719 P.2d 1178 (Idaho May 19, 1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court declared the Nampa Christian
Schools exempt, on religious grounds, from paying unemployment
taxes under Idaho's Employment Security Law (Law), IDAHO LAW
§ 72 et seq. The court held that a religious organization receiving
moral support from an "association of churches" qualifies for the religious exemption if "substantial and competent evidence" shows that
the organization's existence is contingent upon that support.
When an employee dismissed by the school sought unemployment benefits, Idaho's Industrial Commission declared that § 721316A(g)(1) of the law violated the establishment clause. Section 72 is
taken verbatim from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3309(b). The law exempts from coverage services performed:
"(1) In the employ of (i) a church . . . or (ii) an organization ...
operated primarily for religious purposes and . . . operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church, or convention
or association of churches."
Noting the judiciary's practice of avoiding constitutional questions, the reviewing court focused exclusively upon the statute. After
considering fourteen factors bearing on the definition of "church," the
court concluded that the school is not a church for purposes of
§ 72(l)(i). Applying § 72(l)(ii), however, the court concluded the evidence shows the school is "operated primarily for religious purposes." The court concurred with the Industrial Commission's
finding that "[r]eligion pervades every aspect of the [school's] educational program." The school's board members, its teachers, and most
students in grades 7-12 must affirm the thirteen statements of belief
outlined in the school's statement of faith. According to the school's
articles of incorporation, its main purpose is to provide a biblically
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based and faith-integrated education for young people. The school
does not consider any of the subjects it offers "secular." Teachers are
expected to view their employment as a work of faith and attend regular faculty prayer meetings. All students are required to attend
weekly chapel services, and high school students must participate in
Bible study.
The court construed "association of churches" as "a cooperative
undertaking by churches of differing denominations," and concluded
Nampa Christian fit the definition. The school is nondenominational
and was organized by parents from various churches interested in
providing high school students a Christian education.
The record indicates that the school receives less than one percent of its financial support from the churches themselves. However,
the court rejected the state's argument that the school is not "principally supported" by these churches. Financial support, it said, is not
"the only way in which to support an organization... [t]he key is the
quality of the support." The court stressed the Commissioner's finding that "Nampa Christian could not exist as a private school without
the moral support of those several churches" (emphasis by the court).
The court held that because "substantial and competent evidence" revealed the school's existence depended upon it, moral support constituted principal support for purposes of § 72(1)(ii).
Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. United States, 790 F.2d
534 (6th Cir. May 14, 1986).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a federal district
court's determination that the Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes,
Inc., (TBCH) need not file an informational return (Form 990) with
the IRS. The government appealed the district court's refusal to
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury decided that
the principal activity of the T3CH was exclusively religious. The dispute arose over TBCH's refusal to file informational returns from
1979-1982. TBCH was fined for its noncompliance with IRS regulations which require certain religiously related organizations to file 990
forms. After a 1969 amendment, only "'churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches' [and] certain
other organizations" were exempted from filing informational returns.
The tax exempt status of TBCH was not in dispute. However, TBCH
asserted that it was an "integrated church auxiliary," and therefore,
also exempt from filing informational returns. Under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6033(A)(2)(a)(i) and Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), an organization
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is an "integrated auxiliary of a church" exempt from filing an informational return if it is (1) tax exempt, (2) affiliated with a church, and
(3) its principal activity is exclusively religious.
The government conceded TBCH's tax exempt status and its affiliation with a church. However, it argued that TBCH's principal
activity was not exclusively religious. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.60332(g)(5)(ii), "an organization's principal activity will not be considered
to be exclusively religious if that activity is educational, literary, charitable, or of another nature (other than religious) that would serve as
a basis for exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)."
The court characterized as erroneous the government's contention that the principal activity of TBCH "was as a matter of law the
operation of an orphanage dedicated to the public interest," and
therefore not exempt from the filing requirement as an organization
whose principal activity was exclusively religious. The court noted
that neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations
defined the term "principal activity." It then observed TBCH's claim
that its principal activity was exclusively religious because, "its sole
and primary dedication and purpose for maintaining and operating its
child care facility" was the "creation of a pervasively Christian environment" in order to convert and/or indoctrinate children. The Sixth
Circuit found that no error resulted from submitting the factual question concerning the principal activity of TBCH to the jury.
Church of Pan, Inc. v. Norberg, 507 A.2d 1359 (R.I. May 6, 1986).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, reversing a superior court
decision, found that the Church of Pan was not a tax exempt organization under R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-18-30(E) (1956) (1980 reenactment). In reaching its decision, the court relied on the "multiplefactual analysis test" established by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington, 304
N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981). The test evaluates the organization's actual motives and activities rather than its stated purpose.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the organization's
monthly meetings consisted solely of a discussion of environmental
issues. It stated that "no hymns are sung, no prayers are recited, and
•.. no scripture [is read]." It pointed out that many members of the
church practice different religions. The court concluded that the organization failed to satisfy the definition of "religion, as that term is
commonly understood."
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Foundation of Human Understandingv. Departmentof Revenue, State
of Oregon, 301 Or. 254, 722 P.2d 1 (July 1, 1986) (en banc).
The Oregon Supreme Court has determined that property used
by the Foundation of Human Understanding as a meeting facility was
entitled to a property tax exemption, except for that portion of the
building used as a bookstore. It also found that ranch property not
specially assessed as forest land was exempt. However, the court refused to exempt a caretaker's residence or a "parsonage" located
twenty miles from the meeting facility.
The Foundation was organized in 1963 as a nonprofit corporation. The incorporation articles were amended in 1972 to reflect the
change in its status to a church. The Foundation, recognized as a 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) organization for federal income tax purposes and
exempted from California sales tax and Oregon corporate excise tax,
sought an exemption under OR. REV. STAT. § 307.140 from Oregon's
ad valorem tax for three parcels of property. The statute exempts
"houses of public worship" or property used solely for administrative,
educational, literary, benevolent, charitable, entertainment and recreational purposes.
Contending that the foundation was not a nonprofit organization, the Oregon Department of Revenue brought suit challenging a
tax court decision exempting most of the disputed property. It did
not dispute the foundation's status as a religious organization, but argued that the properties were put to commercial as opposed to charitable use.
In ruling on the religious nature/nonprofit question, the court
found that the department had failed to rebut the foundation's prima
facie evidence of its charitable status established by its articles of incorporation providing that the: foundation is "organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes." The court ruled that the department had failed to prove allegations that the foundation founder, Roy
Masters, improperly benefitted from the foundation.
The court also rejected the department's charges that due to the
sale of books and tapes and the charging of tuition to guests at the
ranch, the property was "tainted with impermissible commercial
use." Noting that the department had failed to allege that the primary use of any of the properties was the sale of merchandise, the
court found that only those portions of the property used for the sale
of books or tapes were not entitled to an exemption. Additionally, the
court determined that charging fees did not transform a property
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from exempt to nonexempt status, provided the fees were used solely
for maintaining the charitable institution.
Proceeding to analyze the primary use of the property at issue,
the court found a former church building properly exempted, finding
that it was "used for educational activities, seminars and weekly
group discussions" and purportedly "to promote and to evangelize
and to implement [the foundation's] teachings." The court ruled that
the building served "many of the functions of more traditional religion," but rejected a foundation contention that an on-premises book
store should be exempt because it advanced the aims of the religion,
did not make a profit, and did not compete with commercial businesses. The court also refused to exempt an adjacent caretaker's residence, finding that the use of that property was not reasonably
necessary to the operation of the church building activities. Similarly,
the court refused to exempt a house, located twenty miles from the
foundation's ranch property, purportedly serving as a "[p]arsonage
and staff quarters; provid[ing] a place to get away from students... a
retreat from the retreat .

. . ."

Since the property was not used to

make counselors available to retreatants, it only indirectly benefitted
the organization.
The court also exempted that portion of the foundation ranch
property which it found used to further the organization's religious
activities including work therapy, counseling, individual spiritual examination, and meditation. However, it refused to exempt the majority of the ranch property which was specially assessed as forest land.
III.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Tenn. Oct. 24, 1986), rev'd,

-

F.2d -

(6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1987).

A federal district court has determined that the first amendment
rights of fundamentalist Christian school children and their parents
were violated by required exposure to a reading series which conflicted with their religious beliefs. A group of parents filed an action
seeking injunctive relief and damages against the Hawkins County
Public Schools over the compulsory use of the 1983 edition of the
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston basic reading series. The parents contended that many of the ideas presented in the reading series promoted concepts contrary to their religious beliefs. The court
characterized the case as juxtapositioning "two of our most essential
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constitutional liberties-the right of free exercise of religion and the
right to be free from a religion established by the state."
In September 1983 a group of parents became concerned about
the ideas presented in the texts and requested that they be removed
from the school system. Additionally, the parents requested alternative reading assignments for their children. However, the school
board adopted a resolution requiring teachers "to use only textbooks
adopted by the Board of Education as regular classroom textbooks."
Thereafter, several students who had previously been using alternative
texts were repeatedly suspended for their refusal to read the Holt series or attend classes in which it was being used.
In 1983 the federal district court granted the school board summary judgment finding that, although the texts might contain some
offensive material, they did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights because they appeared to be neutral with regard to religion.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, directing the district court to conduct a trial to determine if the texts unconstitutionally infringed on the parents' free exercise rights.
Upon remand, the district court determined that requiring students with religious objections to read the Holt series impermissibly
burdened their free exercise rights. The court noted the parties' stipulation that the objections were based on sincerely held religious beliefs. Additionally, it rejected the school's contention that in order to
be entitled to first amendment protection, the court must determine
that the beliefs were central to the plaintiffs' faith. Contrary to the
defendants' contention, neither Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), nor various Sixth Circuit cases required a demonstration of centrality, but only that the
belief or action in question be "rooted in religion." On the basis of
stipulations in the record, the court found the parents' beliefs to be
sincerely held religious convictions entitled to first amendment
protection.
The court further noted the stipulation that the parents found
the material in the Holt series offensive, concluding that the major
concern with the Holt series was the cumulative impact of its objectionable themes. The court cited the parents' concern that reading
the entire Holt series could cause a child to "adopt the view of a
feminist, a humanist, a pacifist, an anti-Christian, a vegetarian, or an
advocate of a 'one-world' government." First amendment considerations prohibited the court from finding the parents' religious objec-
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tions to the "repetitive affirmation of those philosophical viewpoints"
unreasonable.
Citing Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the court
found that the choice presented, requiring either that the children
"read the offensive text or give up their free public education," burdened free exercise rights by conditioning "receipt of an important
benefit on conduct proscribed by religious faith, or... denying such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief."
The court observed that a burden on free exercise rights could be
justified by a demonstration that it was the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling state interest. Although it found the state's
interest in providing public education to be "legitimate and overriding," the court determined that mandating the uniform use of the
Holt reading series was not essential for the accomplishment of the
state's goal. It cited the existence of private schools and home
schools, as illustrating the state's acknowledgement that "its interests
may be accomplished in other ways and may yield to the parental
interest in the child's upbringing." Moreover, while the court acknowledged the state's concern that administration of alternative
reading programs would increase managerial problems, it indicated
that the state's interest in uniformity was not absolute and that individualized instruction provided often superior educational results.
In response to the educators' contention that permitting the
plaintiffs to prevail in this action could lead to similar challenges to
other curriculum areas, the court found that the parents' objections
were limited to the reading series and that the school board could not
justify a burden on free exercise rights on the basis of what might be
found objectionable in the future. It also observed that prior to the
school board's resolution, alternative reading assignments had been
carried out without a substantial disruption in the educational process. Further, the court rejected the contention that permitting alternative assignments in this instance could result in a barrage of similar
requests. The court found the homogenous nature of the religious
community and the absence of similar objections in the past made
such an occurrence unlikely. It concluded that Tennessee's compelling and overriding interest in public education could be accomplished
by a less restrictive means than uniform and compulsory use of the
Holt reading series.
Addressing the nature of injunctive relief appropriate to accommodate the plaintiffs' free exercise rights, the court concluded that the
nature of the parents' religious objections to the curriculum indicated
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that no single curriculum could be found that would not present similar problems. Therefore, it found that the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
could not be accommodated in the public schools without resulting in
a violation of the establishment clause. However, it determined that a
reasonable alternative could be fashioned by excusing the children to
a study hall during the time in which the objectionable reading program was undertaken and permitting parents to provide a reading
program in their homes consistent with the state's home schooling
statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-69-3050.
The court ordered the school to permit the students to return to
public school and to be excused from reading instruction, contingent
upon parental submission of written notice of their intent to provide
reading instruction in the home. It further stressed that future determinations regarding other students or additional subject areas were to
be made on a case-by-case basis, and that the instant opinion should
not be interpreted to require the school district to make other accommodations at this time.
Cooper v. Eugene School District.No. 4J., 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298
(July 29, 1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (Mar. 30, 1987).
(No. 86-701).
An Oregon school teacher has filed an appeal in the United
States Supreme Court challenging her suspension and the revocation
of her teaching license for wearing religious garb while teaching. Janet Cooper, a special education teacher in the Eugene public schools,
was suspended after she wore the distinctive white garb of her Sikh
religion while teachi-ng. State statutes prohibit teachers from teaching
in religious dress and require the revocation of teaching certificates of
those who violate the statute. The Oregon Supreme Court found the
statutes constitutional, primarily under the state constitution. It concluded that a school district could find that teaching in religious dress
was incompatible with the role of a school teacher, and reasoned that
restrictions on dress would be permissible to avoid the appearance of
sectarian influence. Moreover, it stressed that the statute had the valid
rationale of "excluding teachers whose dress is a constant and inescapable visual reminder of their religious commitment." Further, it
concluded that the statutes respected and contributed "to the child's
right to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions or heritage untroubled by being out of step with those of the teacher." It
found restrictions placed on the teacher's religious self-expression per-
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missible because the teacher could have explained to her class that she
had become a Sikh without danger of discharge.
Parents'Association of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235 (2d Cir.
Oct. 3, 1986).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
determined that the New York City School District violated the first
and fourteenth amendments by conducting classes for Jewish female
students from a Hasidic private school in segregated public school
classrooms. The suit was brought by the Parents' Association of P.S.
16 alleging that the school district's program permitting students
from Beth Rachel Setmar Hasidic School to receive remedial instruction under Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq., in classrooms located in a
hallway partitioned off from the school's largely Hispanic population,
violated the equal protection and establishment clauses.
The Hasidic faith requires strict separation between both the
Hasidim and the rest of society, and between males and females. The
public school parents objected to the separation of Beth Rachel and
public school students, the provision of Yiddish speaking teachers,
and the teaching of English as a second language which was not available to Hispanic students. In addition, they argued that the "enforced
physical separation of the two groups gave at least the appearance
that the city was endorsing the tenets of the Hasidic religious sect."
The school contended that it did not intend its plan to promote racial
or religious discrimination, but merely sought to encourage the attendance of Beth Rachel students who would otherwise "refuse to attend under the precepts of their religion."
On the basis of Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), a federal
district court had determined that the mere allocation of public school
classrooms for Hasidic children did not impermissibly advance religion, and that requiring the Hasidic children to attend classes in a coeducational environment would infringe on a sincere religious belief.
The lower court characterized the placement of Hasidic students in
separate classrooms as an accommodation, "not as [a] symbolic union
between church and state."
The Second Circuit overruled the lower court concluding that
the program violated the establishment clause. The court, quoting
extensively from Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 375
(1985), examined whether the program created a symbolic union be-
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tween the state and the Hasidic sect. The court found that such a link
had been created and that it was likely to have "a magnified negative
impact" on the students. Citing statements from Hasidim that they
desired to keep their children separate because Hispanics were "different" and "not a good influence on the Hasidic girls," the court concluded that "[t]he lengths to which the city has gone to cater to these
religious views, which are inherently divisive, are plainly likely to be
perceived, by the Hasidim and others, as government support for the
separatist tenets of the Hasidic faith." Moreover, it concluded that for
school children, "the city's plan may appear to endorse not only the
separatism, but the derogatory rationale for separatism expressed by
some of the Hasidim."
The Second Circuit rejected the city's contention that the need to
encourage participation of parochial school students in remedial education classes necessitated the provision of separate classes. The court
concluded that despite the provision of separate classes in other areas,
the city did not segregate private school students along lines of sex,
assign only bilingual teachers, or build partitions in separate parochial
and public school students. Therefore, it stated, "we doubt that the
characteristics of the Plan that are most conducive to perception of
City endorsement of Hasidic religious tenets are common throughout
the city." Furthermore, the court concluded that a finding of the pervasiveness of such conduct would not validate it.
The court also rejected a free exercise clause argument, finding
that prevention of an establishment clause violation served as a compelling interest sufficient to override free exercise objections. However, it found that the city should be able to "devise alternatives for
making its remedial services available to the Beth Rachel students in a
way that neither requires them to disregard their religious beliefs nor
appears to endorse those beliefs.",
Stein v. PlainwellCommunity Schools, No. K85-197CA4 (W.D. Mich.
May 9, 1986).
A federal district court has refused to enjoin graduation ceremony invocations and benedictions in two Michigan school districts.
A suit brought by Bruce Stein and Martha Dahlinger, two Michigan
taxpayers, challenged the practice of including the prayers in graduation ceremonies. The court's ruling followed a 1985 decision refusing
to preliminarily enjoin the prayers. In its earlier ruling, the court had
determined that the practice did not violate the establishment clause
of the first amendment.
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In rejecting the request for a permanent injunction, the court initially determined that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit. It relied on the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of taxpayer standing and
non-economic injury based standing, in Hawley v. City of Cleveland,
773 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1266 (1986).
There the appeals court found that nonfederal taxpayers could file suit
to enjoin "unconstitutional acts affecting public finances." The district court concluded that standing existed for "a resident and taxpayer when suing to prevent public funds from being used to advance
religion." In addition, citing A. C.L. U. v. Rayburn County, 698 F.2d
1098 (11 th Cir. 1983), the court found that noneconomic injury was
sufficient to confer standing. Noting that both plaintiffs were likely to
attend graduation ceremonies in the future, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had demonstrated noneconomic injury in the impairment of their use and enjoyment of a public facility.
Although finding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit,
the court held that the inclusion of the graduation prayers did not
violate the three-prong test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). In evaluating the program under the secular prong of the
Lemon test, the court said that although the prayers would have a
religious meaning to some, for many the invocation and benediction
would provide merely a ceremonial opening and closing of the graduation program. Moreover, the court concluded that the inclusion of
the prayers did not have the principal or primary effect of advancing
religion. In reaching this conclusion, it stressed that (1) neither
school district required the prayers, (2) the schools exercised no control over the content of the prayers, nor the decision to include them
in the ceremony, (3) the prayers did not result in daily indoctrination,
(4) most members of the audience were adults, "presumably not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination," and (5) the graduation
programs have an essentially ceremonial nature. It also concluded
that no excessive entanglement between church and state was occasioned by the prayer, observing that graduation ceremonies were held
only once per year and required only a minimal contact between
school officials and local clergy.
Kay v. David Douglas School Dist. No. 40, 79 Or. App. 384, 719 P.2d
875 (May 21, 1986), rev'd en banc, 303 Or. 574, 738 P.2d 1389 (July
8, 1987).
An Oregon appeals court has determined that including an invocation in high school commencement ceremonies violates the Oregon
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Constitution. In a suit brought by four members of the 1984 graduating class, a state trial court enjoined David Douglas School District
No. 40 from including an invocation as part of its commencement
activities. The trial court ruled that prayer would violate both federal
and state constitutions. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's
injunction under the state constitution.
Citing prior Oregon case law, the appeals court found that challenges brought under Art. 1, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution could be
evaluated under the tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), and the broader framework of federal constitutional analysis. The court observed that under Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), not all governmental references to religion were prohibited. It
further recognized the significance afforded history and tradition in
establishment clause analysis, noting that in "one unique case, Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the court had employed an exclusively historical analysis."
Furthermore, it noted that there were permissible areas of state
involvement with religion, such as recognizing December 25 as a national holiday to accommodate the religious practices of individuals.
However, it stressed that accommodation must be distinguished from
endorsement or approval. It found the school district's choice of
prayer over nonreligious means to create an atmosphere of dignity
and solemnity reflected a nonsecular purpose. Moreover, it determined that regardless of the subjective intent of the school board,
prayer by its nature was religious and therefore "the purpose for
which a prayer is given necessarily must be religious."
In addition, the court found that the decision to include the invocation failed the secular-effect prong of the Lemon test by creating the
impression that government was sponsoring or endorsing religion. It
reasoned that including a religious invocation would have "created an
impression that the school district assigned special significance to
prayer." That impression, the court found, would be intensified by
the school district's intent to have a senior teacher deliver the invocation. The court, citing Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), also ruled
the voluntary nature of attendance at the event was irrelevant in determining whether an establishment clause violation had occurred.
IV.

PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. Feb. 3,
1986).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
affirmed a decision by a federal district court granting summary judgment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
against Fremont Christian School, a church-owned and operated private school in California. The school had claimed a religious exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., when a married woman employee charged that the school unlawfully discriminated against her in denying health insurance benefits while providing it to "heads of households," thus generally
excluding married women employees. The school based its defense on
constitutional grounds, citing, as the reason for treating women employees differently, their religious belief in the biblical concept of the
husband as the head of the household who is required to provide for
it. Until 1976, the school had compensated married male employees
at a rate higher than similarly-situated female employees. When the
determination was made that such disparity could be illegal, the
school discontinued the practice. The school now provides uniform
pay scales and equal disability and life insurance benefits, regardless
of sex or marital status.
In enacting Sec. 702 of Title VII to eradicate discriminatory employment practices, the court determined that Congress provided a
narrow, rather than a complete, exemption for religious institutions.
The court acknowledged that Sec. 702 prohibited state involvement in
ecclesiastical decisions of employment if a religious institution
presented "convincing evidence" that an employment practice favored members of one faith or denomination over another, citing
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). Similarly, religious institutions may base
relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences. Nevertheless, Title VII is applicable to such organizations with regard to race, color,
sex or national origin.
The court rejected arguments that the health insurance compensation program was (1) a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ), concluding that the BFOQ exception did not apply to the
discriminatory provision of benefits; and (2) nonviolative of the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), because it is based on religious beliefs,
noting that the program was based on no other factor than sex.
In its constitutional analysis, the court found a compelling state
interest in eradicating sex discrimination and upholding equal employment opportunities. Coupling this with the fact that eliminating
the "sexually discriminatory health insurance compensation pro-
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gram" would not interfere with religious belief, and "only minimally,
if at all, with the practice of religion," the court said the school was
barred from raising the religion clauses of the first amendment as a
defense.
Bennett v. Department of Fair Employment and Housing, No. C-497
487 (Cal. Sup. Ct., L.A. Cty. Apr. 24, 1986).
The Los Angeles County Superior Court has filed a final ruling
granting a motion for summary judgment in a challenge to the exemption afforded religious organizations under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 52. Mary Bennett, a
Roman Catholic over the age of 40, filed suit claiming religious and
age discrimination against the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing after she was fired from her position with American Lutheran Church and School. Citing the Act's exemption of nonprofit
religious organizations, the department declined to process the complaint. Because the statute's definition of "employer" excluded religious organizations, Bennett argued that it violated the state and
federal constitutions by denying equal protection to employees of religious institutions and by violating the establishment clause.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the Fair Employment
and Housing Commission's claim that its jurisdiction over religious
organizations was only restricted when a challenged action was "sectarian in nature." The commission's interpretation of the statute's exclusion of religious organizations as "employers" was based on a
decision it reached during the pendency of the lawsuit. The court
found it significant that the department and all other defendants had
previously observed an interpretation that they lacked jurisdiction
over "all complaints of discrimination against religious institutions."
The court determined that "no basis in the language of the statute
appears for giving [religious organizations] less than a categorical
exclusion."
The court cautioned that religious institutions must have some
exemption from prohibitions against employment discrimination or
the commission could require "female Moslem rabbis in Jewish temples, and married Roman Catholic priests." The court found that
given the necessity "to avoid unconstitutional inhibition of religion,"
the statute was neutral on the question of whether a religious organization had a right to discriminate.
Addressing establishment clause concerns, the court rejected the
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plaintiff's contention that the statute had no secular purpose. It determined that the statute's purpose was "to avoid entanglement of an
administrative agency in the complexities which would always arise
when it became necessary to determine whether practices alleged to
be discriminatory were a necessary part of a religious dogma." The
court recognized that "the broader the exclusion the less the
entanglement."
Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. Oct. 16,
1986).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that
Loyola University did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in reserving three tenure track vacancies in its philosophy department for Jesuits.
The dispute arose after university authorities informed Jerrold S.
Pime that there would not be any openings in the philosophy department. The department had determined that of the 31 tenure track
positions, the three openings anticipated for the fall of 1979 should be
reserved for Jesuits in order to maintain a total of seven Jesuit instructors. Pime, who is Jewish, left Loyola the following spring and filed a
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
The court initially found that there was "no hint of invidious
discrimination against Pime on account of his religion," stressing that
"[t]he faculty resolution excluded every non-Jesuit from consideration, whether of the Catholic faith or otherwise." However, it concluded that because Pime's faith would preclude him from becoming
a Jesuit, he had a claim of religious discrimination.
The court noted that Title VII permits educational institutions to
discriminate on the basis of religion if the institution is "owned, supported, controlled or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society." The provision
further permits an employer to discriminate on the basis of religion
where religion is a bona fide occupational qualification "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."
The court found that membership in the Jesuit order was a bona
fide occupational qualification under the statute. In reaching its conclusion, it noted that a significant Jesuit presence was "important to
the successful operation of the university." The court stated, "it ap-
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pears to be significant to the educational tradition and character of
the institution that students be assured a degree of contact with teachers who have received the training and accepted the obligations which
are essential to membership in the Society of Jesus." The court observed that in previous cases evaluating defenses of bona fide occupational qualification, the courts had focused only on the content of the
particular job at issue. However, it determined that having a Jesuit
presence on the philosophy faculty was reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the university and that "fixing the number as
seven out of thirty-one [was] a reasonable determination." It upheld
the trial court's determination that the reservation of three positions
for Jesuits was made in good faith.
A similar result was reached in Maguire v. Marquette University,
627 F.Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 1986) (Jesuit university may
refuse to hire female theology professor).
Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P.2d 794 (Mont. Nov.
20, 1986).
The Supreme Court of Montana has affirmed a trial court's summary judgment order dismissing the wrongful discharge complaint
brought by Mary Pat Miller against the Catholic Diocese of Great
Falls. Miller brought suit charging breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment after she was terminated
from her position as a fifth and sixth grade teacher from the Catholic
school because of her handling of disciplinary problems. The school
requested summary judgment,, asserting that application of the tort of
bad faith would impermissibly interfere with the school's religious
liberty.
In concluding that permitting the suit to go forward would violate the religion clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the
court noted that it was undisputed that the school played an important role in the religious mission of the Roman Catholic Church.
Moreover, it upheld the contention that all aspects of the institution's
program, including discipline, were "permeated with the religious
mission of the school."
The court also determined that the case was distinct from cases
involving wage rates or the application of neutral principles of law to
church property disputes, finding that the present claim would require
"an analysis of the discipline methods used in teaching various school
subjects, including religion itself." The court further found that a ju-
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dicial determination on the question of good faith on the part of
school administrators would require the court to "examine the
school's discipline policy as applied to classroom instruction, covering
both religious and nonreligious subjects, and to evaluate [school officials'] interpretation and application of that discipline policy." It reasoned that because discipline was so intertwined with teaching, which
was likewise intertwined with religious principles, judicial resolution
of the issue would violate the free exercise clause. Applying the standard of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the court concluded
that Miller's claim was not a right "of the highest order and not
otherwise served so as to overbalance the defendant's claim to the free
exercise of religion."
The court also rejected Miller's claim that a ruling for the school
would result in an establishment clause violation. The court evaluated the claim using the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), to determine whether an establishment of religion
had occurred. The court noted that the school had a pervasively religious character and purpose, that denial of the tort of bad faith would
not result in an intrusion into church affairs, and that the resulting
relationship between state and church authority would be negligible
because the court's ruling applied only to the instant situation.
V.

HOME SCHOOLING

Patzer v. North Dakota, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D.) cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 99 (Oct. 6, 1986).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to review the convictions of four sets of North Dakota parents convicted of violating
the state's compulsory education law. The parents, who engaged in
home schooling, were convicted of violating a provision of the law
that requires all teachers, including home school teachers, to be state
certified. The parents had argued that the state had failed to demonstrate either a compelling interest in compulsory education or that its
certification requirement was the least restrictive means of accomplishing such an interest.
VI.

STATE REGULATION OF PARACHURCH MINISTRIES

Department of Social Services v. Emmanuel Baptist Pre-School, 150
Mich. App. 254, 388 N.W.2d 326 (Apr. 7, 1986), app. granted, 428
Mich. 907 (June 30, 1987).
The Michigan Court of Appeals has affirmed a lower court's or-
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der enjoining a fundamentalist Baptist church from operating a preschool without a license. In addition, the court of appeals reversed
that part of the lower court's decision exempting the preschool, on
first amendment grounds, from complying with four state rules and
regulations. According to the: court, the church is not exempt from:
Rule 104, prescribing qualifications for the preschool's program director; Rule 106(l)(c), requiring a program which fosters a positive selfconcept among children; Rule 107(2), strictly limiting the use of corporal punishment; and a series of rules permitting inspection of the
church's financial records. Michigan's child care organizations act, as
amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.111 et seq., requires that child
care centers be licensed and empowers the Department of Social Service (DSS) to develop rules regulating their operation. Maintaining
that religious education is part of its ministry, the church maintained
that the rules and licensing requirement violated its right to religious
liberty.
The court reviewed the church's free exercise claim in light of the
test set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). First, the belief, or action motivated
by belief, must be religious in nature. Should the claimant show that
the regulations under review impose a substantial burden on its exercise of religion, the state succeeds only if the regulation meets a compelling state purpose. The court found the state's interest to prevail,
stating: "[W]e are of the opinion that the state's compelling interest in
protecting and nurturing its very young children, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)... and in licensing and regulating day-care
facilities for minors, renders any burden on the church's exercise of
religion a constitutionally permissible one."
The court analyzed each of the regulations under the test mentioned above. It found that ]DSS Rule 104 and the licensing requirement imposed an insubstantial burden on the church's free exercise
rights. It concluded licensing regulates "the pre- school's secular activities as a pre-school-i.e., the physical care of 2-1/2 to 5 years old
in attendance there-[not] the content of the church's fundamentalist
teachings." Additionally, it noted that the burden Rule 104 imposed
was "constitutionally insignificant," because the church could employ
two other state- sanctioned means to avoid its burden. "Moreover,"
the court continued, the state's compelling interest in protecting its
young would "override any burden imposed upon the church in finding teachers from accredited institutions."
The court concluded that Rule 106(l)(c) and the rules authoriz-

431]

1986 COURT SURVEY

ing DSS inspection of the church's financial records impose no burden
at all. While citing the church's biblical belief in mankind's "innate
depravity apart from Christ," the court relied on DSS testimony that
the church doctrinal position and the state's 'positive self-concept'
rule for children could co-exist. Furthermore, it stressed that the
church had failed to cite any actual infringement upon its religious
beliefs. Again, the court emphasized that "even had we found Rule
106 to burden the church's free exercise of religion" the state's compelling interest would take precedence.
The court also determined that the church was not exempt from
Rule 107(2) which prohibits spanking day-care children with any instrument other than the open palm of the hand. The church's rationale for the use of a ping-pong paddle is grounded in the biblicallybased admonition, "Spare the rod, spoil the child." The court concluded that the burden to the church was outweighed by "the state's
interest in protecting its very young ... children from physical harm
by prohibiting potentially abusive forms of discipline."
Additionally, the court rejected the church's claim that the state
regulations, particularly Rule 104, constitute excessive governmental
entanglement with church affairs in violation of the establishment
clause. It stated, "The mandates of the licensure scheme have nothing to do with the establishment of a religion." Lastly, rejecting a
claim that the DSS rules were unconstitutionally vague, the court
found them "as precise as the subject matter permits."

VII.

TORT CLAIMS

Bates v. Kingdom Hall of the Congregation, No. 9510 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 6, 1986).
The Ohio Court of Appeals (Second Appellate District) has affirmed in part and reversed in part an order from a trial court dismissing the complaint of a disfellowshipped Jehovah's Witness.
Howard Bates brought suit seeking judicial review of the action taken
by Church elders. The trial court, relying on Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), dismissed the case on the
pleadings, finding it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue.
In reaching its decision, the appellate court quoted at length
from Milivojevich where the Supreme Court held that civil courts lack
the competence to review certain decisions of ecclesiastical bodies.
The court noted that Bates was claiming that the elders who disfellowshipped him were acting beyond the scope of their authority.
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However, it also observed that the elders claimed their action had
been affirmed by the 'Watchtower Tract and Bible Society. The Society is the highest judicatory in that religious body. Applying the command of Milivojevich, the appellate court partially affirmed the lower
court's dismissal. It held that in all the possible scenarios that could
have occurred the court would be deprived of jurisdiction. It reasoned that, if the Watchtower Society did review the elders' action, it
either affirmed or ratified the elders' decision, thus judicial review
would be foreclosed under Milivojevich. It further observed that, regardless of whether the elders exceeded their authority, if the decision
had not been appealed, Bates retained an avenue of relief within the
church hierarchy and. the case was thus not ripe for civil review.
The court refused, however, to dismiss Bates' defamation claim
against the church. He charged that " 'inaccuracies' were 'stated'"
during the proceedings. The church denied the allegations and advanced affirmative defenses, including: (1) that the statements were
privileged; (2) that they were true; (3) that there was no publication of
defamatory material; (4) that the statements were invited by Bates;
and (5) that they were made pursuant to religious belief. The court
concluded that, although resolution of the issues might appear "to be
subject to the very same dangers set forth in Serbian, we find that that
might not necessarily be the case." It further observed that legally
cognizable claims for relief had been raised. It found that claims of
privilege were limited to those recognized at law and some of the defenses asserted by the church might "be determinable without having
to resolve ecclesiastical questions." Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of the slander claim was premature.
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1986) cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (Oct. 14, 1-986).
The Supreme Court has denied Rev. Lloyd Hutchison's request
for review of the Sixth Circuit's determination that civil courts lacked
jurisdiction to review a decision by church authorities. Hutchison,
who was forced to retire pursuant to church disciplinary rules, argued
that church leaders had acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or collusively
in applying the rules. The Sixth Circuit found that the first amendment precluded judicial review of an ecclesiastical determination that
the minister was not suitable for a church appointment because of
problems with local congregations. Additionally, the court found
that even if civil court review were appropriate in cases of fraud or
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collusion, Hutchison had failed to make an adequate demonstration of
such claims.
Edmondson v. Church of God or Sanctified Church, No. 85-151-11
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 1986).
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has affirmed a $110,000 judgment. The amount was awarded a member of The Church of God or
Sanctified Church who sued the church and its general overseer for
the publication of defamatory statements.
The dispute arose when Edmondson sought access to church financial records withheld by the general overseer. In response to his
suit to compel disclosure of the records, the church circulated a letter
characterizing him as an "attempted destroyer of the... CHURCH's
influence." Edmondson then filed an action charging that the letter,
which had been published in The Truth and Life, a nationwide church
publication, was defamatory.
On appeal, the court rejected the church's contention that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction because the suit involved "purely ecclesiastical matters." Reviewing Tennessee case law, the court of appeals found that courts in Tennessee have jurisdiction over
ecclesiastical disputes involving civil or property rights. Furthermore, "neither the First Amendment nor Article 1, § 3 of the Tennessee Constitution protect churches or their officials from causes of
action alleging tortious conduct." Although defamation is a tort, the
court noted that claims for defamation within the religious context
are judicially barred if "the communication [between the parties was]
intended to further their common interests or enterprise." Indicating
that the church's failure to file a timely transcript of the record below
required it to "presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings
was found or should have been found in [Edmondson's] favor," the
court concluded the church's publication was motivated by ill will
toward Edmondson.
O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d 693 (Dec. 12, 1986).
Ruling in a case brought against Fatima Crusade, a fundamentalist sect of the Latin Rite Church, the Idaho Supreme Court has abolished the cause of action for alienation of affections in Idaho.
However, the court upheld a jury's award of damages for invasion of
privacy. Jerry O'Neil brought suit charging that members of the Cru-
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sade alienated his wife Pauline's affections and invaded the marital
and family privacy between Jerry and his wife and children.
The dispute arose after Pauline became involved with the Crusade. Prior to her marriage, Pauline was raised in a Roman Catholic
family where religion was of primary importance. Jerry was not
Catholic, received no instruction prior to the marriage in the Catholic
faith, and did not agree to raise children from the marriage as
Catholics. The Fatima Crusade adheres to traditional Catholic beliefs
and rejects the changes in Catholic practice brought by Vatican Council II. Consequently, they believe that marriages between Catholics
and non-Catholics are invalid, unless the non-Catholic spouse has received instruction in the Catholic faith and has agreed to raise any
children of the marriage as Catholics. They also reject the current
Pope as the head of the Church.
Pauline's mother and sister were active members of the Fatima
Crusade. In early 1974, Pauline visited her mother in Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho, which was also the headquarters of the church, in order to
learn more about the faith. According to court testimony, Pauline
came to Coeur d'Alene because she wanted to join the church. She
was not seriously contemplating divorce at the time. Additionally,
she stated that she was afraid of Jerry when he came to visit because
of his unreasonable and violent behavior. While in Coeur d'Alene,
Pauline was instructed that she would not be able to live with Jerry as
a wife, but could live with him in a brother-sister type relationship.
This relationship proved unworkable and the O'Neils were divorced
within one and one-half years. The divorce decree granted custody of
the children to Jerry and restrained Pauline from imposing the philosophical or religious beliefs of the Fatima Crusade on the children.
In December 1975, Jerry filed suit against various church officials, Pauline's sister and mother, and the corporate entity of the
church. Following the trial, the jury awarded approximately $1 million in damages for alienation of Pauline's affections, invasion of marital privacy, invasion of the children's privacy, and punitive damages.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, determining that Jerry had failed to meet
his burden of proving the elements of either alienation of affections or
invasion of privacy.
In commenting on the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to
the alienation of affections claim, the trial court found that conduct
without "justification or excuse, coupled with a purpose or design, to
adversely affect the mental attitude of one's spouse to the detriment of
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the other is a keystone of wrongful interference with a marital relationship." However, the court concluded that in light of the strong
protection given the free exercise of religious belief, which includes
the right to criticize and ridicule the religion of one's spouse, such
expressions could not form the basis for an action for alienation of
affections. Moreover, the court noted that parents had a right to be
interested in and to offer advice to their married children with regard
to their marital relationships. It found that a presumption existed
that parents would exercise such a right with honesty and good intentions. It therefore found that a party alleging alienation of affections
against a parent must demonstrate that the parent acted maliciously
and with the intent to alienate the affections of the child. The court
concluded that where the defendants involved were parents, close relatives, or clergy, there was "a limited privilege to counsel and advise a
spouse concerning marital affairs and religious beliefs and that the
same are constitutionally protected rights of the exercise of free religion and freedom of speech. To overcome these privileges, the plaintiff must produce evidence that shows specific and malicious intent to
interfere with plaintiff's marriage." The court overturned the jury
verdict having concluded that Jerry had failed to show that the defendants' conduct was motivated by ill-will or the intent to break up
the marriage, rather than by a natural and good faith interest in Pauline's welfare and free exercise of religion.
Finding that an alienation of affections action had many "ill effects" which "outweigh any benefit it may have," the Idaho Supreme
Court abolished the cause of action. However, the court found that
the trial court erred in granting a judgment for defendants with regard to the invasion of privacy claims.
The court noted that an invasion of privacy claim must be premised on the intentional intrusion into something entitled to be kept
private, such as an individual's seclusion or solitude or his private
concerns or affairs. The court stressed that such intrusion resulted in
liability "if it would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Citing testimony presented at trial of the church's actions toward Pauline, the court noted that the jury had been told that during his visits
to Couer d'Alene, Jerry's family saw him for only a few minutes at a
time and only in the presence of a chaperon, that church officials
"purposefully kept his family from seeing him," and in one instance
hid the family. Further, it noted that the jury heard evidence that
Jerry was told he would be required to join the church in order to
marry Pauline, while she was told that he need only receive instruc-
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tion and agree to raise the children in the faith. Moreover, the court
cited evidence that Pauline was told that if she returned to her husband, and found herself "giving in and acting as a wife," it was her
duty to leave him. Additional evidence reviewed included testimony
from former Fatima Crusade members describing the church's indoctrination techniques.
The court cited the limits on religious free exercise as related to
family counseling identified by the Washington Supreme Court in
Carrieriv. Bush, 419 P.2d 13:2 (1966). In Bush the court identified
"good faith and reasonable conduct" as the touchstones of "any qualified privilege that may arise from any invited and religious direct[ed]
family counseling, assistance, or advice." Evidence was also reviewed
of religious indoctrination of the children following the divorce order,
despite the restraining order.
On the basis of such evidence the court found the trial court partially erred in overturning the jury's verdict. It found the evidence
presented sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that an invasion of
privacy had occurred. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court directed
the trial court to reinstate the $250,000 jury award for invasion of the
children's privacy. However,, noting the difficulty in determining
what percentage of the $250,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive
damage award to Jerry was attributable to the abolished alienation of
affections cause of action, the court ordered a new trial on Jerry's
invasion of privacy claim.
Gillespie v. Elkins Southern Baptist Church, 350 S.E.2d 715 (W. Va.
Nov. 19, 1986).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has reversed'a circuit court judgment awarding a discharged pastor $45,998 in damages
for wrongful discharge. James Gillespie brought suit against the Elkins Southern Baptist Church following its vote to dismiss him as pastor in March 1981. Gillespie was called as pastor of the church in the
fall of 1978, consistent with the church's constitution and bylaws.
However, approximately two years after his assumption of the pastorate, Howard Shumake, chairman of the board of deacons, allegedly
began to try to oust: Gillespie. Following a failed vote to vacate the
pulpit during a business meeting, on the following Sunday Shumake
announced to the congregation that there was to be a congregational
meeting at 6:30 p.m. to discuss dismissing the pastor. The church
membership voted 31 to 25 to discharge the pastor. A jury awarded
Gillespie $53,000. However, the court denied his request for rein-
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statement and required that he return approximately $7,000 of the
damage award representing the income he had earned between his
dismissal and trial.
The appeals court initially noted the limited nature of judicial
review over church controversies. It observed that a civil court could
not adjudicate any controversy implicating purely ecclesiastical or
spiritual matters, but was entitled to exercise jurisdiction over property and contractual rights even when one of the parties was a church
or religious organization. It concluded that Gillespie's claim involved
property or contractual rights. However, the court cautioned that
had the Elkins Southern Baptist Church been a hierarchical church,
Gillespie would have been required to exhaust any internal conflict
resolution mechanisms. Because the church was congregational in
polity, the court concluded that judicial scrutiny of final actions affecting property rights was appropriate.
The court rejected Gillespie's wrongful discharge claim, noting
that he was an at-will employee and had failed to assert that his termination violated "any substantial public policy," or that he "received
any definite promise of job security." Additionally, the court stressed
that analyzing his claim under either of those theories would "require
the civil courts to examine the reasons for the pastor's termination.
Almost inevitably, this analysis would require the courts to go beyond
completely neutral principles of law to inquire into church doctrine to
determine if the termination was arbitrary." Such an analysis was
barred by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment
in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
The court also rejected Gillespie's assertions that his discharge
was void because the special meeting at which the vote was taken was
improperly called. The court noted a provision in the church's constitution providing that special meetings could be called "upon recommendation of pastor and/or a body of deacons." Although there were
conflicting arguments regarding whether individuals calling the meeting were serving as deacons at the time and whether "a body of deacons" had agreed in advance to call the meeting, the court refused to
address the issue. It concluded that because the church was congregational and held the power to hire and fire the pastor, absent compelling reasons, it would limit its analysis to inquiring whether the
congregation met and whether it acted to terminate the pastor's services. The court stressed that there was no claim that any member of
the congregation failed to receive actual notice of the meeting, that
the meeting was inadequately attended, nor that nonmembers partici-
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pated in the vote. It therefore concluded that the congregation acted
to terminate Gillespie's services.
Meroni v. Holy Spirit Associationfor the Unification of World Christianity, 119 App. Div. 2d 200, :506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sept. 2, 1986).
A New York appeals court has granted the Unification Church's
motion for summary judgment in a suit charging intentional infliction
of emotional distress and wrongful death. The suit was brought by
Charles Meroni claiming that his son's suicide resulted from his exposure to Unification Church indoctrination techniques. Charles Meroni, Jr., a Columbia University student, entered a church training
program in October 1977. He left the organization one month later.
In January 1978 he committed suicide.
In denying Meroni's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and wrongful death, the appellate court noted that in Matter
of Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianityv. Tax Commission of City of N.Y, 450 N.Y.S.2d, 435 N.E.2d 662 (1982), the
New York Court of Appeals recognized "that the Unification Church
has religion as its 'primary' purpose inasmuch as much of its doctrine,
dogmas and teachings and a significant part of its activities [are] religious." Therefore, the court concluded that under Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the first amendment foreclosed evaluation of the church's beliefs in attempting to
impose liability.
The court also rejected Meroni's contention that a suit could be
maintained since churches remain liable for intentional torts, notwithstanding religious beliefs. The court found that Meroni had failed "to
allege conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." The
court found that the challenged activities: fasting, chanting, "forms
of hypnotic control," "intensive, heavy and protracted" exercise programs, limited access to media, family and friends, and physical isolation were insufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Moreover, it characterized such activities as
"common and accepted religious proselytizing activities." The court
also concluded that. allegations that the younger Meroni was brainwashed should be evaluated "as a method of religious indoctrination
that is neither extreme nor outrageous when it is considered that the
subjects... are voluntarily participating... and the various activities
mentioned above, which allegedly induced the 'mind control' were
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not considered by our society to be beyond all possible bounds of
decency."
Additionally, the court said that the charge that the Unification
Church recruited Meroni with knowledge that he was "'emotionally
disturbed' and 'susceptible to forced employment,' " did not make the
proselytizing conduct extreme or outrageous. The court observed
that, "it is not uncommon for those who are confused and depressed
to seek guidance from a religion, and to submit themselves to the dictates of that religion to solve their problems."
The court also cited the absence of evidence indicating false imprisonment, violence or physical or mental torture. The court observed that there was no evidence that Meroni was gravely disabled.
Additionally, it said that he had the "personal and individual right to
determine for himself whether to associate with the defendant
church."
VIII.

INTRACHURCH DISPUTES

Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 637 F.Supp. 478 (N.D. Ga.
May 5, 1986).
A federal district court has dismissed a case against the Southern
Baptist Convention (SBC) charging parliamentary irregularities at the
1985 SBC annual convention. Three messengers to the 1985 meeting
filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of the proper interpretation
of SBC bylaws, an injunction requiring compliance with that interpretation, and an order enjoining certain committee members from serving. The court granted summary judgment to the SBC, finding that
the dispute involved "questions of internal church affairs and governance over which [it] has no jurisdiction." The court accepted the
SBC's claim that adjudicating the dispute would require resolution of
an ecclesiastical controversy in violation of the separation of church
and state. The court rejected the Crowders' assertions that civil judicial review was permissible because no interpretation of Baptist doctrine or Christian belief was required. The Crowders urged that the
court could apply neutral principles of law in determining whether a
violation of Robert's Rules of Order had occurred at the 1985
meeting.
The court determined that application of neutral principles of
law was not relevant in determining whether a court had jurisdiction.
Rather, the court observed that a civil judicial body must first determine whether the ecclesiastical dispute before it is one over which it
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can legitimately exercise jurisdiction. The district court distinguished
the instant case from Jones v.. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), where the
Supreme Court determined that a court could apply "neutral principles of law" to adjudicate a church property dispute. The district
court observed that in Wolf, it was the "state's interest in the peaceful
resolution of property disputes" which gave rise to civil jurisdiction.
Only after the existence of such a state interest was ascertained could
neutral principles of law be applied to resolve the dispute.
The court characterized the Crowders' contention that the suit
was a breach of contract claim stemming from an incorrect interpretation of Robert's Rules of Order as an oversimplification of the case.
It found the actual issue in the case to be a question of church governance. The court said "[w]hether Reverend Dr. Stanley's rulings were
correct or patently incorrect is irrelevant because a decision as to the
validity of his rulings would involve this court in the internal affairs of
the Southern Baptist Convention."
The court quoted language from Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 670 (1871), where the Supreme Court enunciated limitations
on civil review of ecclesiastical decisions. In Watson, the Supreme
Court affirmed "[tihe right to organize voluntary religious association
...and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions
of faith within those associations, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within
the general association, [as] unquestioned." It further quoted from the
Watson decision concerning the "implied consent" of the individual to
unite with a religious body and to be in submission to it. It was said
that the consent would be vain "if any one aggrieved by one of their
decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have it redressed." In
addition, it noted that the essence of a religious organization's right to
establish tribunals for determination of questions was "that those decisions be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only
to such appeals as to the organism itself provided for."
The district court also cited Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1979), where the Supreme Court rejected
an attempt to justify civil court review of a bishop's defrockment on
the basis that the ecclesiastical decision was made arbitrarily.
The district court found that the Crowders' suit requested the
same type of judicial evaluation of "conflicting testimony concerning
internal church procedures and [the rejection of the] interpretations of
relevant procedural provisions of [higher church] tribunals that the
Supreme Court had rejected in Milivojevich."
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IX.

CHAPLAINCY PROGRAMS

Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 1986).
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed a federal district court decision
that the Veterans Administration's discharge of a chaplain did not
violate the Title VII prohibition on religious discrimination or the
religion clauses of the first amendment.
The Reverend Franklin Baz, an ordained Assembly of God minister, was discharged during his probationary period from a position
at a V.A. medical center having a large population of psychiatric patients. The district court found that although the hospital had cited
several incidents indicating that Baz had difficulty in discharging his
responsibilities, the "crux of [his] problems lay in his relationship
with the patients and with the medical staff and in [his] view of his
ministry and his calling to preach the Gospel." Among the incidents
that prompted the dismissal was an evening music service, designed as
a recreational period for patients, which Baz conducted as a Christian
evangelical meeting. The V.A. claimed Baz proselytized among the
patients and used inappropriate illustrations in his sermons. Baz purportedly interfered with decisions of the medical staff and entered operating room amphitheaters without approval to pray for patients.
The district court observed that Baz "saw himself as an active, evangelistic, charismatic preacher while the chaplain service and the medical staff saw his purpose as a quiescent, passive listener and cautious
counselor."
The Seventh Circuit found that the V.A. had not violated the
provisions of Title VII requiring an employer to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of its employee unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Baz claimed that the Title
VII analysis differed from that typically applied to the religious practice of an employee hired by a secular employer to do a secular job.
Baz asserted that "he was hired so that he might practice his religion
in the service of a secular employer, and was fired when his employer
did not approve of his doing exactly that." However, the court applied the normal Title VII analysis, observing that Baz was not simply
a preacher performing a religious function. Citing the detailed instructions by the V.A. to Baz, the court characterized Baz as a secular
employee carrying out duties for which his religious training had
qualified him.
The court observed that an employer may not fire an employee
because of religious practices unless the employer demonstrates that it
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could not accommodate the practice. Baz was found to have satisfied
his burden of making a prima facie demonstration that his discharge
was based on his religious practice. However, the V.A. had met its
burden of demonstrating that it could not accommodate Baz's religious practice. According to the Seventh Circuit, the primary motivation in terminating Baz was the furtherance of the hospital's
purpose, which is "the overall well being of the patients." The court
ruled that the V.A. had also shown that Baz could not conform to the
hospital's multidisciplinary patient care approach, that guidance on
how to conform had been offered and that transferring Baz to a nonpsychiatric facility would cause an undue burden on the chaplain service and the V.A.
The court also rejected Baz's argument that a prohibition on
proselytizing violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the first amendment. The court noted that public employment could
not be conditioned on the surrender of constitutionally protected
rights, but observed that the government could use time, place, and
manner restrictions in balancing the free exercise right against a valid
public interest. The court cited Pickering v. Board of Education, 391

U.S. 563 (1968), as requiring that the court strike a balance between
the employee's interests and "the interest of the government, as an
employer, in promoting the: efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." The court stressed that "First Amendment rights must be applied in light of the special characteristics in a
particular case." Since Baz's activities interfered with his therapeutic
duties, a limitation on his religious expression was justified.
The court rejected the establishment clause contention, in which
Baz argued that the V.A. had established an "institutional theology"
which "limit[ed] and restrict[ed] the manner in which [he] could pray
with patients, preach and also limited the content of his sermons."
The court held that the V.A. had instituted an ecumenical approach
to its chaplaincy. The purpose of providing a chaplain at V.A. facilities was to prevent patients from having to choose between care and
religious worship. Further, the court remarked that allowing Baz to
pursue his religious activities might produce establishment clause
problems: "[u]nleashing, a government-paid chaplain who sees his
primary role as proselytizing upon a captive audience of patients
could do exactly that." The court characterized the staff at the V.A.
hospital as "attempting to walk a fine constitutional line while safeguarding the health and well-being of the patients."
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Kurtz v. Baker, 630 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1986).
A federal district court has refused to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting the chaplains of the United States House of Representatives and Senate from making disparaging remarks concerning
the beliefs of nontheists. Dr. Paul Kurtz, a professor of philosophy
and self-described secular humanist, brought suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against what he characterized as the discriminatory exclusion of nontheists from the Senate's guest chaplain program. In the alternative, he requested termination of federal funding
of the congressional chaplaincies. He contended that in opening remarks, Senate Chaplain, Dr. Richard Halverson, had routinely disparaged nontheistic beliefs in violation of the establishment clause.
In an earlier adjudication the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the allegation that the exclusion of
nontheists from the guest chaplain program was discriminatory.
Although the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of legislative chaplain programs in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), it had failed to address the appropriate limits of the chaplain's
prayers. Therefore, the court requested further briefing on the allegedly disparaging prayers of the Senate Chaplain. The court noted a
caveat in the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh which could be understood to prohibit disparaging comments by a legislative chaplain.
The Supreme Court had determined that the chaplain's prayers were
not problematic in Marsh where there was "no indication that the
prayer opportunity ha[d] been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other faith or belief," and therefore that it
need not "embark on a sensitive evaluation or ...apprais[e] the con-

tent of a particular prayer."
The court acknowledged the comments identified in the complaint as disparaging to nontheistic beliefs. However, it noted that in
the interim between its prior decision and the instant case several actions had occurred which, while not rendering the case constitutionally moot, made it inappropriate for the court to grant Kurtz the
relief he sought. Specifically, the court observed that Senate Counsel
had difficulty in developing a formal rule detailing the meaning and
appropriate parameters of prayer and had suggested that a preferable
resolution to the dispute could be obtained by having Dr. Kurtz reach
an agreement directly with Dr. Halverson. Following that suggestion,
Dr. Halverson and Dr. Kurtz exchanged correspondence which the
court characterized as suggesting that "both men have grappled with
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the other's concerns with sympathy and in good faith." The court
identified a portion of Dr. Halverson's April 24, 1986, letter stating
that "disparagement was the farthest thing from my mind .... I not
only regretted that disparagement had been communicated, but have
tried subsequently to guard against such a possibility."
In arguing that the exchange of letters reciting his intent to
"guard against making further disparaging remarks," rendered the
dispute too attenuated for judicial resolution, Halverson cited Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Hess, 745 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In Hess the court ruled that a decision by District of Columbia
judges to respect the rights of individuals whose religious beliefs prohibited them from rising when a judge entered the room made the
"likelihood of recurrent confrontations ... too small to warrant decision of the issue."
The court found the reasons for withholding injunctive relief
here were even more appropriate than in Hess, noting that the Chaplain's letters promising to guard against disparagement would be kept
on file as a matter of public record, and that Halverson had agreed to
"maintain a copy of the correspondence in the Senate Chaplain's office to assure that it. would be available to his successor." While the
court noted Kurtz's argument that the Chaplain's refusal to adopt an
official policy to "avoid remarks which advance or disparage any particular faith or belief," belies "the contention that [future disparagement] 'is much too small to warrant decision of the issue,'" it found
that the balance of considerations mandated that the constitutional
issue should not be reached at this point. It cited a preference to
avoid constitutional resolution when fairly possible, and the importance of Dr. Halverson's sensitivity to Kurtz's objections in addition
to his desire to avoid future disparaging comments. Discussing Halverson's actions, the court said that although failing to rise to the level
of a rule they gave "every indication of being the product of sincere
and deliberate thought and offer hope that Dr. Kurtz will find nothing
in Rev. Halverson's future prayers with which to take exception."
The court further noted that Kurtz had failed to seek relief
through legislative channels. Although it found that the case was not
technically moot, it concluded that equitable relief was inappropriate
at this time.
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X.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

benMiriam v. Office of Personnel Management, 647 F.Supp. 84
(M.D.N.C. Nov. 7,1986).
A federal district court has dismissed a suit filed by Fagele
benMiriam, a clerk-typist at the National Institute of Environmental
Health Science, alleging that the use of the abbreviation "A.D." on
Appointment Affidavit Form SF-61, requires him to subscribe to a
Christian dating system in violation of his free exercise rights.
benMiriam, who is Jewish, brought suit challenging the use of the
designation on Form SF-61, alleging violation of free exercise and
equal protection clauses and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court concluded that the abbreviation, which stands for the Latin
phrase "anno Domini," meaning "year of Our Lord," had been rendered secular and had a negligible impact on religious belief. It noted
that the form did not criminalize any religious belief or opinion, nor
force anyone to embrace a religious belief or make any statement conflicting with his religious tenets. The court also took judicial notice of
the similar phrase, "In the year of Our Lord" in the Constitution. It
found that the abbreviation was a constitutionally permissible chronological reference and in SF-61 had a purely secular usage. Furthermore, the court noted that prior Supreme Court cases had analyzed
similar terms and phrases under the establishment clause and had
found them permissible, in part because their religious significance
had been diminished or completely lost.
In analyzing the dating system under the test advanced in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for determining a violation of
the free exercise clause, the court found the designation had a purely
secular impact that rendered the burden on benMiriam's religious belief "so minimal as to be non-existent." It therefore found that the
government need not advance a compelling state interest nor demonstrate that its interest could not be achieved by a less restrictive
means. The court also noted that benMiriam had created his own
exemption by simply striking out the offending abbreviation.
XI.

SPEECH/POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Christian Science Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of San
Francisco, 784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 1986), modified, 792 F.2d
124 (9th Cir. Jun. 16, 1986), reh'g denied, 807 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
Sept. 4, 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 953 (Jan. 27, 1987), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1361 (Mar. 2, 1987).
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The Ninth Circuit has determined that the San Francisco Airport violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution by terminating the lease of the Christian Science Reading
Room.
The Christian Science Reading Room had rented space at San
Francisco's Municipal Airport since 1976. In 1984 the Director of
Airports notified the Reading Room that, based on legal advice, it had
adopted a policy of not renting to religious organizations. The airport
took steps to evict the Reading Room. After proceedings before the
Airport's Commission failed to secure revocation of the eviction order, the Reading Room filed suit in federal district court. A permanent injunction was issued ordering the airport to make rental space
available to the Reading Room. The airport appealed the injunction
and several post trial orders.
The Ninth Circuit found that the airport's action violated the
Reading Room's equal protection guarantees because the airport
failed to establish a rational relationship between its action and any
legitimate governmental purpose. The district court had applied a
strict scrutiny test because the airport had treated religious groups in
a distinct fashion. The Ninth Circuit determined that it was unclear
whether treating religious organizations differently than all others
constituted a suspect classification. While it conceded that treating an
individual religion in a distinct manner probably constituted a suspect
classification, it found the question of "[w]hether all religions together
constitute a suspect class . . a far more complex question that the
courts have not previously addressed." However, the court found it
unnecessary to resolve the question because the airport's action failed
to meet the requirements of a rational basis test.
The airport argued that its decision not to rent space to religious
groups was mandated by the establishment clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions. Compliance with the dictates of the constitutions was found to constitute a legitimate interest. However, the
court determined that the policy did not further that interest, since
renting space to religious organizations did not violate either
constitution.
The court applied the establishment clause test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1973). It found that the prior
airport policy, which permitted rental by religious organizations, had
the "purely secular" purpose of obtaining revenue. It also found that
the airport's prior policy did not have the effect of advancing religion.
It stressed that a governmental policy which incidentally benefits reli-
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gion was not precluded by the establishment clause. It found two
inquiries relevant to the question of whether government action violates the secular effect prong: (1) Did the state confer any imprimatur
of approval on the religious sects or practices? (2) Are the benefits
conferred generally available to nonreligious groups or individuals?
Addressing the first concern, the court found nothing to indicate that
the state "endorsed the religious views and beliefs of the Reading
Room." The court observed that airports do not have the same symbolic identification with the state as do other governmental buildings.
Secondly, it stressed that the space was equally available to all who
wished to rent it. It noted the absence of any suggestion that all religious groups, anti-religious groups, or groups with other social or
philosophical views were denied access. Finding that the policy did
not violate the excessive entanglement prong, the court said, "the
Reading Room did not tell the Airport how to run its business, and
the Airport did not tell the Reading Room how to run its operations."
The court further determined, that based on its findings with regard to the federal Constitution, the initial airport policy did not violate the stricter requirements of the California Constitution. It
concluded that, because renting to the religious groups did not violate
the establishment clause, there was no rational relationship between
the airport policy and any legitimate state interest.
United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. July 17, 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1603 (Mar. 30, 1987).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the criminal convictions of Stacey Lynn Merkt and John Elder, who had been convicted of conspiring to assist aliens in illegally entering the country.
The appellants challenged their convictions on several grounds, including the first amendment.
The court rejected appellants' argument that their convictions violated their religious rights, since they were religiously motivated to
be involved in sanctuary activities for El Salvadorans. Stressing that
the immigration laws under which they were convicted were facially
neutral on the question of religion, the court found that conduct,
rather than belief, was being regulated in a religiously neutral manner.
The court applied the stringent test of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), although it indicated that a stringent test need not be
applied in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. Roy, 106
S.Ct. 2147 (1986), because of the facial neutrality of the statute.
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Applying the Yoder test, the court concluded that since the statute contained no exclusive prohibition on religious practices or beliefs,
but only related to conduct that aided or sheltered illegal aliens, it did
not unduly burden appellants' free exercise of religion. The appeals
court noted that the trial court had not questioned the sincerity of the
appellants, but it did observe that Christian belief does not mandate
participation in the sanctuary movement and that other means, short
of violating the laws, were available to assist the El Salvadorans.
The court found compelling the government's interests in uniform enforcement of border control laws and the "preservation of our
national identity as defined by the immigration laws." With regard to
the latter, it noted that illegal immigration upsets the balance
achieved in the national-origin quotas established by Congress.
The court, in rejecting the appellants' suggestion of deporting the
aliens or confiscating; vehicles used in transporting the aliens, ruled
that less restrictive alternatives to criminal convictions did not exist.
In a separate argument, the appellants claimed that the trial judge
should have recused himself because of religious pressure. The court
of appeals rejected this argument, finding that the affidavits submitted
in support of the motion to have the judge recuse himself were legally
insufficient.
Bemis Pentecostal Church v. Tennessee, Madison Equity No. 8 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1986), rev'd, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. May 26, 1987).
The Tennessee Appeals Court has found that churches contributing money and purchasing advertising in opposition to a referendum
permitting the sale of liquor by the drink were political campaign
committees under the state's Campaign Financial Disclosure Act,
TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 2-10

et seq. However, the court invalidated the

Act because it violated the free speech provisions of the first
amendment.
Several churches organized in Madison County, Tennessee, filed
suit seeking to have the Act declared unconstitutional as applied after
they were ordered to comply with its requirements. The churches had
either contributed funds to a campaign committee known as "Citizens
Against Drugs and Alcohol," or purchased advertisements in a local
newspaper in opposition to-a 1984 referendum that would have permitted the sale of liquor by the drink within the city limits of Jackson,
Tennessee. Following the defeat of the referendum, the Madison
County district attorney notified the churches that they would be re-
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quired to comply with the provisions of the Act by filing a post campaign financial statement.
Construing the provisions of the Act, the court determined that
the churches fell within each of three possible definitions of political
campaign committees. It found that a church with two or more members making expenditures to oppose a legal referendum would be included under a definition reaching "a combination of two or more
individuals ...

making expenditures

. . .

to support or oppose ...

a

measure." Additionally, it concluded that the churches were clearly
"organizations making expenditures... to support or oppose a measure .... ." Finally, it determined that any church making a contribution of $250 or more to defeat the referendum was "a group of
persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures to support or oppose any ...measure during a calendar quarter in an aggre-

gate amount exceeding Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250)."
In determining that the statute violated the free speech provisions of the first amendment, the court distinguished compelling governmental interests, said to exist in the instant case, from those found
sufficient in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the
Supreme Court upheld the requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, mandating the disclosure of the
identities of campaign contributors. The Tennessee court reasoned
that the purpose of the disclosure requirement, to identify the candidate's most generous supporters, so that the public might be able to
detect any post election special favors, was not applicable in a referendum election.
The court further found the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), did not
hold that a compelling state interest justified the disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures in referendum elections, citing
FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Therefore, it declared the Act unconstitutional. In light of its disposition of
the case, the court declined to address the churches' free exercise
clause and establishment clause arguments.
XII. MEDICAL CARE

Walker v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 185 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222
Cal. Rptr. 87 (Jan. 10, 1986), review granted, 224 Cal. Rptr. 340, 715
P.2d 260 (Mar. 27, 1986).
A mother charged with involuntary manslaughter and child en-
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dangerment in the death of her daughter filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against her, claiming a lack of probable cause to believe she
had committed a crime and inadequate notice that her actions were
criminal. The court rejected both her statutory and due process
arguments.
Laurie Walker enlisted the aid of two Christian Science practitioners who treated her four year old daughter with prayer in lieu of
medical care. The child died of acute purulent meningitis. Walker
contended that the "spiritual treatment" exemption to the state child
neglect statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 270, exempts a parent from
criminal liability for child endangerment and involuntary manslaughter for treatment of a child with prayer in lieu of medical care.
The court ruled that the statute's language precluded "any inference that a parent [providing] spiritual treatment would be insulated
against charges of involuntary manslaughter or child endangerment."
The court also rejected the mother's contention that the legislative
history of the act evinced an intention to provide a religious treatment
defense to the two charges. After analyzing the legislative history of
the provision, the court concluded, "[i]t appears clear the Legislature
did not intend to extend to parents complete discretion in providing
their children with prayer treatment as a substitute to necessary medical care."
Hall v. Indiana, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. May 27, 1986).
The Indiana Supreme Court has affirmed the reckless homicide
convictions of Gary and Margaret Hall in the death of their son.
However, the court reversed convictions for child neglect, finding that
because convictions for that offense required proof of no facts other
than those necessary for conviction under the reckless homicide
charge, the Halls had been placed in double jeopardy.
Affirming the convictions for reckless homicide, the court rejected the Halls' assertions that the convictions were contrary to law.
Joel Hall died of acute bronchial pneumonia after his parents, acting
pursuant to their religious beliefs, refused to seek medical care. The
parents claimed that their conduct did not constitute "a substantial
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, and therefore [did]
not meet the definition of recklessness." The court ruled that the evidence that the Halls did not seek medical treatment for Joel despite
awareness of their son's condition demonstrated that the jury's verdict
was not contrary to law. It rejected their attempt to analogize their
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conduct to that specified as a defense in a child neglect statute in order to demonstrate that the use of prayer in lieu of medical treatment
was acceptable. The court, noting that there was no statutory defense
to reckless homicide, found that prayer was not a defense "when a
caretaker engages in omissive conduct that results in the child's
death."
Relying on Tawney v. State, 439 N.E.2d 582 (Ind. 1982), the
court found that the conviction for child neglect failed under a double
jeopardy analysis because it did not require the proof of facts different
from those necessary under the reckless homicide charge.
Randolph v. New York, 117 App. Div. 2d 44, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837 (May
8, 1986), aff'd as modified, 69 N.Y.2d 844, 514 N.Y.S.2d 705, 507
N.E.2d 298 (Mar. 19, 1987).
In a wrongful death action, a New York appellate court has reversed a $500,000 jury verdict awarded a Jehovah's Witness who
"competently and unequivocally advised" her doctor not to administer a blood transfusion under any circumstances during a caesarean
section. Mrs. Randolph's instructions were pursuant to the Jehovah's
Witness belief "that blood transfusions are a violation of the law of
God, and that transgressors will be punished by God .... "
Medical complications developed during surgery. Her physician
received authorization from the City Corporation Counsel to proceed
with a blood transfusion. Notwithstanding his efforts, he was unable
to save her life.
Randolph's husband brought suit alleging negligence. Reviewing
the expert testimony, the appellate division concluded the blood
transfusion given by the physician was not the proximate cause of
Mrs. Randolph's death. Experts testified that Randolph's condition
had become irreversible prior to her physician's receipt of authorization for the transfusion.
XIII.

CHILD CUSTODY

Rogers v. Rogers, 490 So.2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 18, 1986).
The Florida District Court of Appeals (First District) has determined that a trial court's parental custody decision impermissibly interfered with a mother's free exercise of religion. Judy Rogers
appealed a trial court's decision that conditioned her custody of her
minor children on her severing of all ties with The Way International.
Following divorce proceedings, Roger's former husband sought cus-
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tody of the couples' minor children alleging that The Way "had psychologically brainwashed his wife to the extent that she was
physically and mentally incapable of taking proper care of the two
children." Several elements of the organization's religious beliefstructure were identified by expert witnesses as having a detrimental
effect on parental ability, including "ridding oneself of illness through
raising the level of spirituality, [beliefs concerning the] satanic possession of certain people, the practice of speaking in tongues, and the
rigorous physical discipline of the children."
The trial court awarded custody of the children to the mother on
condition that she eliminate all contact with the organization including "any meetings, tapes, visits, telephone or written communications,
or financial support." Rogers was also enjoined from "subjecting the
children of [the] marriage in any manner whatsoever to the dogmas of
The Way International." In reversing the trial court, the appeals
court found that a judge could consider a parent's religious beliefs as
one of several factors in making a custody award. However, conditioning a custodial award "upon the curtailment of a parent's religious activities or beliefs violated the parent's free exercise of religion
rights." It noted that the Alabama Supreme Court had made a similar
determination in Hilley v. Hilley, 405 So.2d 708 (1981).
XIV.

PRISONER RIGHTS

Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3234 (Jun. 22, 1987).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district
court's determination that the doctrine taught by the Church of
Wicca is a religion. However, it reversed an order requiring prison
officials to allow Herbert Dettmer, an inmate at Powhatan Correctional Center, access to six objects used in the mediation practice
taught by the church. Officials had refused Dettmer's request that he
be allowed to possess a hooded white robe, sea salt or sulfur to draw a
protective circle on the floor, candles, incense, a kitchen timer to
awaken him from short trances, and a small, hollow statute of a god
or goddess of the deity to "store spiritual power called down during
mediation," to assist him in 'his worship. The requested items were
considered contraband and were deemed to be a threat to the safety
and security of the institution.
After the deputy director of the Department of Corrections refused to review his request, Dettmer filed an action contending that
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prison officials had deprived him of his freedom of religion. The district court determined that the Church of Wicca was a religion and
that Dettmer was entitled to access to the ceremonial objects. The
court's order permitted prison officials to retain custody of the items,
making them available to Dettmer at reasonable times for worship
services which the officials would be permitted to supervise.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that
the Church of Wicca was a religion entitled to first amendment protection. Citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964), the appeals court found that the district court properly considered "whether
the church occupies a place in the life of its members 'held by the
orthodox belief in God' in religions more widely accepted in the
United States," and found that members of the church "adhered to a
fairly complex set of doctrines related to the spiritual aspect of their
lives." Additionally, it cited with approval the district court's findings
that the church's doctrine concerning worship ceremonies paralleled
those of more conventional religions, and noted the long history of
witchcraft. It rejected the government's argument that the church
was not a religion, but rather a "conglomeration" of "various aspects
of the occult, such as faith healing, self-hypnosis, tarot card reading,
and spell casting," that would not be considered religious if standing
alone. Citing Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the
Fourth Circuit found that a practice need not be logical or internally
consistent to warrant a conclusion that it is a religion. The court also
rejected the state's contention that because the items Dettmer sought
were not required by the Church of Wicca, they were unprotected,
noting that under Thomas, religious observances need not be uniform
to merit first amendment protection.
However, the court ruled that the district court had erred in requiring prison officials to allow Dettmer access to the requested items.
The trial court had determined that because suitable substitutes could
be found for several of the items and that dangerous items such as
candles, incense and salt could be kept in a safe location, denial of
access was not the least restrictive means available to accomplish the
state's compelling purpose.
The appeals court relying on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
found the least restrictive means test inapplicable in determining a
prisoner's free exercise rights. In Bell, the Supreme Court held that
although prisoners retained a right to freedom of religion, restrictions
on first amendment rights were to be "evaluated in light of the central
objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional secur-
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ity." It further found that courts should accord deference to prison

administrators' decisions concerning the accommodation of prisoners'
rights in light of order and discipline requirements, absent evidence of
exaggeration of those needs. The Fourth Circuit found "no substantial evidence indicating that prison officials exaggerate the difficulties
in supervising individual inmates' use of contraband articles in religious rites," and that prisoners participating in conventional religious
services were not allowed to possess the prohibited items. Thus, it
concluded that the refusal to permit Dettmer access to the items he
requested was not discriminatory.
XV.

JUSTICIABILITY

Americans United for Separation of Church v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194
(3d Cir. Mar. 21, 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 314 (Oct. 20, 1986),
reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 660 (]Dec. 8, 1986).
A petition has been denied by the United States Supreme Court
that sought review of a Third Circuit decision dismissing a case
brought by a coalition of religious groups protesting diplomatic recognition of the Vatican. The Third Circuit ruled that the organizations
bringing suit lacked standing to challenge diplomatic recognition, citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation
of Church and State, 452 U.S. 464 (1982). The circuit court found
that if the special recognition accorded Vatican City resulted from the
Vatican's unique place in the world community, rather than presidential or congressional action, there was an insufficient injury to justify
the suit. Additionally, the Third Circuit rejected the assertion that the
groups had standing as taxpayers.
Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 505
N.Y.S.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d 183, (June 5, 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
574 (Dec. 1, 1986).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to review a decision of the New York Court of Appeals dismissing the Church of St.
Paul and St. Andrew's challenge to the designation of its property as a
historic landmark. The church argued that subjecting it to the
landmark preservation law, ADMIN. CODE OF CITY OF N.Y., ch. 8-A,
§ 205 - 1.0 et seq.,, violated the first amendment. The New York
Court of Appeals had determined that the case did not present an
issue ripe for judicial determination.

